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CAROL A. FIX,
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Defendant and Appellant.
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this
matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2) (f) , Utah Code Annotated,
as amended, which gives the Court appellate jurisdiction over
appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving conviction of a first degree or capital felony.

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1.

Issue:

Was

there

sufficient

evidence

to

support the jury's verdict that Appellant was involved in an
accident resulting in injury to the alleged victim (emphasis
added)•
Standard of Review: In challenging the sufficiency
of evidence, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence
supporting the jury's verdict, and then demonstrate how this
evidence,

even

viewed

in the most

insufficient to support the verdict.

favorable

light,

is

State v. Pilling, 875

P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470 (Utah
App. 1991).
insufficient

An appellate court will reverse on the basis of
evidence

only

when

the

evidence

is

so

inconclusive or improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime.
2.

State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540 (Utah 1994).
Issue: Did the trial court err in refusing to

allow evidence of Normand Knudson's intention to sue Ms. Fix
for money damages, and refusing to allow a proffer of the
relevance of the same?
Standard of Review: The refusal of a trial court to
allow evidence is reviewed

for abuse of discretion, and

appellant must demonstrate that the error would have had a
substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict.
State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987).
2

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Section 41-6-31, Utah Code Annotated, as amended:
(1)
accident

The operator of a vehicle

resulting

in

injury

to

or

involved
death

person...shall:
[Perform certain enumerated acts not at
issue in this appeal]

3

of

in an
any

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of the Nature of the Case
This

is

an

appeal

from

a

final

judgment

of

conviction of a class A misdemeanor - Failure To Remain at the
Scene of an Accident, Section 41-6-31(1), Utah Code Annotated,
as amended, in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor,
District Judge.
Statement of the Course of the Proceedings
Appellant was charged with the crimes of Aggravated
Assault, a third degree felony, and Failure to Remain at the
Scene of an Accident, a class A misdemeanor, arising out of
events occurring on March 25, 1994.

She was bound over to

stand trial after a preliminary examination on May 31, 1994,
and had a two-day jury trial on November 3 and 4, 1994.

She

was acquitted of the felony charge, but convicted of the
misdemeanor.

She was referred to Adult Parole and Probation

for a presentence investigation and filed a post-trial Motion
to Arrest Judgment.
Disposition in the Lower Court
On December 12, 1994, at defendants sentencing
hearing, Judge Taylor denied her Motion to Arrest Judgment,
and sentenced defendant to informal probation.

4

Statement of the Facts
Appellant, Ms. Fix, was charged with the crimes of
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, and leaving the
scene of an accident, a violation of Section 41-6-31, Utah
Code Annotated, as amended, for an incident occurring on March
25, 1994, in which a Mr. Normand Ray Knudson was the alleged
victim.
Ms. Fix and one Lori Bryan, were in downtown Ogden
around noon on March 25, 1994. Testimony of Lori Bryan, Tr.,
Vol I, at pages 3-8.

A dispute arose between the two women

over who had cut off whom in traffic.

The dispute involved

some body language-type of profanity, hostile looks, etc.
Testimony of Lori Bryan, Tr., Vol I, at pages 3-8.
Ms. Fix wanted to confront Ms. Bryan concerning what
Ms. Fix perceived to be Ms. Bryan's rude and abusive behavior
towards her.

Testimony of Carol Fix, Tr., Vol. II, at pages

11-12. Ms. Bryan had a different perspective on the incident,
and testified generally that, except for giving Ms. Fix "the
bird" downtown in Ogden (well-known extended middle-finger
gesture) , it was Ms. Fix who was rude and abusive. Testimony
of Lori Bryan, generally, Tr., Vol. I, at pages 3-54.
Ms. Fix, in her car, followed Ms. Bryan, in her car,
as Ms. Bryan drove eastbound, out of Ogden, heading up Ogden
Canyon to pick up her children from a day care/babysitter
service operated by Normand Knudsonfs mother.
Lori Bryan, Tr., Vol. I, at pages 12-16.
5

Testimony of

Ms. Bryan and then Ms. Fix entered onto a road to
the immediate north of the Ogden River, where the day care was
located, and were again involved in a confrontation after Ms.
Fix pulled in immediately behind Ms. Bryan.

Again, Ms. Fix

and Ms. Bryan disagree as to which of them was angry or
verbally abusive, or aggressive.

Compare, Testimony of Lori

Bryan, Tr., Vol. I, pages 16-27, with Testimony of Carol Fix,
Tr., Vol. II, pages 15-20.
The encounter near the day care between Ms. Bryan
and Ms. Fix, only lasted a minute or so after which Ms. Bryan
went into the day care center to call the police.
of Lori Bryan, Tr., Vol. I, at pages 24-26.

Testimony

Ms. Fix had not

gotten out of her car, nor threatened Ms. Bryan directly.
Testimony of Carol Fix, Tr., Vol. II, at page 18; Testimony of
Lori Bryan, Tr., Vol. I, at page 52.
The altercation between Ms. Bryan and Ms. Fix had
been observed somewhat by Normand Knudson and his father from
a point

about

150 feet to the west

on the same road.

Testimony of Normand Knudson, Tr., Vol. I, at pages 55-61.
When Ms. Bryan went into the day care building, Ms. Fix turned
her car around and pulled up parallel to Ms. Bryan's.

Mr.

Knudson claims he saw Ms. Fix spit repeatedly into the open
window of Ms. Bryan's car. Testimony of Normand Knudson, Tr.,
Vol. I, at page 62, while Ms. Fix says she spat only once, and
not in the open window, but on a tire.

Testimony of Carol

Fix, Tr., Vol. II, at page 21. Most significantly, Ms. Bryan
6

did not see this.

Testimony of Lori Bryan, Tr., Vol. I, at

page 40, lines 22-25.
After spitting, Ms. Fix started to drive westbound
to leave the scene by the same route by which she had arrived.
Ms. Bryan, despite repeated prodding from the prosecutor at
trial, would not say that she drove off at excessive speed.
Testimony of Lori Bryan, Tr., Vol. I, at pages 28-30.

Ms.

Bryan did not observe the ensuing encounter between Ms. Fix
and Normand Knudson. Testimony of Lori Bryan, Tr., Vol. I, at
page 53.
From this point on, Ms. Fix and Normand Knudson tell
greatly varying versions of what occurred.

Mr. Knudson

testified that Ms. Fix drove her motor vehicle at him and
struck him while travelling at anywhere from 15 to 25 miles
per hour. See, generally, testimony of Normand Knudson, Tr.,
Vol. I, at pages 55-126; Testimony of David Lord, Tr., Vol.
II, at pages 127-129; Testimony of Terry Thompson, Tr., Vol.
I, page 144, at lines 10-12 (25 mph).

While giving varied

descriptions of Ms. Fix's action in driving at and running him
down, Mr. Knudson at trial was consistent that she drove at
him fast and that the impact with his body was substantial "...And the car hit me, rolled me across the front hood, and
I was able to push myself away from the car as much as I
could, and slammed into the fence."
lines

5-8

(emphasis

added);

"...and

Tr., Vol. I, page 64,
I slammed

the same

shoulder into the fence." Tr., Vol. I, page 66, lines 1-2; "I
7

don't remember actually saying the back of my head# but I do
remember saying that I had hit the car with probably every
part of my body:

my knees, my torso, my head, my arms, when

I was slammed onto the hood of the car." Tr., Vol. I, at page
76, lines 4-8 (emphasis added); "...The vehicle hit me at a
substantial rate of speed. I hit and slid into the windshield
because the car was still moving forward. It slammed me down.
The car moved me forward....I had been struck on the right
side of my body and my head had been hit."

Tr., Vol. I, at

page 76, lines 13-20 (emphasis added); "...that's when the
bumper hit my feet and slammed me onto the hood."
I, page 77, lines 9-10

Tr., Vol.

(emphasis added); "...after I had

gotten slammed onto my right side, I rolled and pushed myself
off from the car." Tr., Vol. I, page 80, lines 5-7; also line
10 (emphasis added); "...I fell back and my right shoulder
slammed into the fence..."

Tr., Vol. I, page 86, lines 6-7.

The following is testimony that is a representative
summary of Mr. Knudson's version:
Q.
... So the car came at you at
20, 25 miles an hour, right?
A.
Approximately.
Q.
All right.
Certainly not
coming at you then slowing way down to
maybe two, three miles an hour. That's
just out of the question?
A.
Definitely.
Q.
And that was a hard impact
between your body and that car?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
It - smacked you down.
A.
I was thrown onto the hood of
the car.
It took me from standing
vertical and threw me to the hood.
Tr., Vol. I, page 84, lines 12-24.

Thus, Normand Knudson's basic version was that Ms. Fix struck
him at a high rate of speed; that he was thereby thrown up
onto the hood of her car, into the windshield, and then off
the driver's side into a chain link fence.
Normand

Knudson

claimed

to

have

suffered

the

following injuries as a result of being struck by Ms. Fix's
car:

right arm and right shoulder, Tr., Vol. I, page 65;

right knee, Tr., Vol. I, page 66; back, Tr., Vol. I, page 68;
bleeding hand, Tr., Vol. I, page 69.
following on cross-examination:
cuts and bleeding.

He acknowledged the

that there were no visible

Tr., Vol. I, page 82, lines 16-25; and

that there were no visible bruises, Tr., Vol. I, page 83,
lines 10-15.

He also testified that Ms. Fix after having

struck him with her car, left the scene knowing he was
injured.

Tr., Vol. I, page 62.
Ms. Fix

occurred.

had a different version of what had

She testified that as she was leaving, Normand

Knudson came charging out, looking extremely angry, from
behind the big cement box. Testimony of Carol Fix, Tr., Vol.
II, page 24; that she hit her brakes and came to a stop, Tr.,
Vol. II, page 24, and that Normand Knudson jumped up on the
car, by which she explained that she meant "...And when I say
he jumped upon the car, he jumped and his hands were on the
hood of the car."

Tr., Vol. II, page 24, lines 10-12.

She

further testified that he was never on the hood (other than
his hands) , that she became frightened, and that, as he tried
9

to push her car back, she inched forward in first gear. Tr.,
Vol. II, pages 25-28. He then jumped to the driver's side of
the car, lunged at her, punched the rear, driver's side
window, called her a bitch, and she left. Tr., Vol. II, pages
27-29.
The State entered into evidence as Exhibit #5 Ms.
Fix's written statement to Deputy Thompson, the investigating
officer. The State contended that this statement corroborated
Normand Knudson's version.

The written statement, in part,

reads "...and [I] was leaving when a man jumped upon the hood
of my car. He wouldn't get off and he was determined to stop
me.

(He actually ran into the path of the car and jumped on

the hood).

He called me a bitch, etc....I did not stop

because the man looked crazy - he finally got out of the way
and he punched the passenger window behind the driver's seat.
I continued to drive away and I did not look back.

I did not

call the police because there was nothing to discuss between
the woman and myself.
would have stopped.
control class at YCC."

I did not know the man was hurt or I
I have checked myself into an anger
R., p. 287 (Exhibit Sheet).

Deputy Terry Thompson of the Weber County Sheriff's
Department corroborated that Normand Knudson described Ms.
Fix's car as accelerating at him, Tr., Vol. I, page 139. On
cross-examination, he admitted the following: that there was
no dent to the hood of her car, Tr., Vol. I, pages 141-142;
that there was no visible damage to the windshield area, hood
10

or grille, Tr., Vol. I, page 143; and that the only mark he
found was an alleged paint scuff in the lower, center hood,
Tr., Vol. I, page 141, which he "...wouldn't have found it if
I hadn't of known what I needed to look for."
page 143, lines 3-4.

Tr., Vol. I,

Significantly, Deputy Thompson did not

offer an opinion on, nor was he asked by the prosecution, as
to what caused the basically invisible paint scuff.
Ms. Fix called Dr. Howard Lund, the emergency room
doctor who treated Normand Knudson about four hours after the
incident.

Dr. Lund, and his supporting staff, observed no

difficulty in Mr. Knudson's walking for a prolonged period of
observation, Tr., Vol. II, page 87; found no signs of head
injury, Tr., Vol. II, page 88; neck and back supple and
nontender, Tr., Vol. II, page 89; no acute abrasions, scar,
erythema or areas of pain; Tr., Vol. II, page 89; and in
general, "...no injury apparent with that exam whatsoever."
Tr., Vol. II, page 95, lines 9-10.

Dr. Lund also testified

that at 25 mph, he would expect to see scrapes, bruises and
abrasions, Tr., Vol. II, pages 90, 96-97.
On cross-examination, Dr. Lund explained that Mr.
Knudson, had complained of pain in the right arm, wrist and
back, but he "...did not find pain in the arm, in the wrist,
or in the back,"
explained

Tr., Vol. II, page 98, lines 21-23, and he

his methodology,

Tr., Vol.

II, pages 99-100,

concluding that "I can tell you that there was no exhibited
pain during my exam."

Tr., Vol. II, page 100, lines 12-13.
11

Ms. Fix also called Mr. David Lord, an accident
reconstructionist,

as a witness.

following:

preliminary

the

Mr. Lord reviewed the

hearing

transcript,

which

contained Normand Knudson,s sworn testimony, more than a month
after the incident; all witness statements taken by the
investigating officer (Deputy Thompson); Deputy Thompson's
accident scene drawing; and personally inspected the scene.
Tr., Vol. II, pages 122-123.

He also examined Mr. Knudson's

medical records from his emergency room visit (Dr. Lund's
records), Tr., Vol. II, page 126.
Mr. Lord gave his opinion from two approaches. One,
calculating how fast Ms. Fix's car was going at impact, using
Normand

Knudson's

version

of

events,

and

the

second

calculating the speed at impact, if any, using Mr. Knudson's
description of his injuries.

As to the former (calculating

speed) , Mr. Lord testified that at fifteen miles per hour
impact, there should have been broken bones, smashing into the
windshield, severe leg bruising, damage to the car's grille,
denting of the hood.

Tr., Vol. II, pages 131-134.

He would

have expected damage to the chain link fence or Mr. Knudson's
body, as a result.

Tr., Vol. II, page 135.

Mr. Lord examined the photos of Ms. Fix's car (the
same ones Deputy Thompson observed in his testimony), and
testified that the damage to her car was "...consistent with
either no impact or a very, very low speed; not enough to
break the grille work - the plastic grille work."
12

Tr., Vol.

II, page 143, lines 14-16. Most significantly, Mr. Lord used
as a basis for all of his calculations and opinions, Normand
Knudson/s repeated testimony at the preliminary hearing, as
follows:
A.
On page 20, line 15, part of an
answer to a question of yours, stated she
just accelerated towards him.
Later in the next answer, starting
at line 22, he said "She continued to
accelerate, from the time she started
towards me, she never slowed down. She
seen me standing in the road, and she ran
through me, she ran me down."
Again, on page 22, starting at line
one, "Answer:
Well, she continued to
accelerate. I was concerned that, you
know, I figured she probably is doing 15
to 20 miles an hour, and she wasn't - she
didn't seem to be slowing down."
On page 30, the question is asked:
"Okay. You're somewhere between 100 and
200 feet away and this car is stationary;
that's your testimony?"
"Yeah. Yeah."
Answer - or question, I'm sorry.
"Okay.
Now, and you say she just
accelerated right at you and you didn't
have any chance to move anywhere, while
she travelled from scratch 100 to 200
feet; you don't think you had a chance to
move anywhere?
Is that what your
testimony was?"
Answer: "I backed - I take a couple
of steps back. I already said that."
On page 42, a question is: "Where how did you get up on the hood, whether
you jumped or you jumped straight up;
now, what part of your body was first hit
by the car going 20 miles an hour?"
"My right - my right leg."
Page 52, on line 24, question is
asked again, "And you just stood there?"
Answer: "I just stood there?"
Tr., Vol. II, page 127, line 24 - page
129, line 6.
In sum, Mr. Lord's testimony was that at even ten or
13

fifteen miles per hour, which is lower than Normand Knudson's
many, albeit varied, versions either Mr, Knudson would have
suffered a significant observable physical injury, or that
there would have been evidence of significant damage to Ms.
Fix's car.

No such evidence of either was observed by Mr.

Lord.
After a two day jury trial, Ms. Fix was acquitted of
the aggravated assault charge, and convicted of the class A
misdemeanor leaving the scene. Verdicts, R. at pages 272-273.
She filed a post-verdict Motion to Arrest Judgment, which was
denied.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Ms. Fix will argue that the evidence, even viewed in
a light most favorable to the guilty verdict, was insufficient
to support a finding that she was involved in an accident
which resulted in an objectively observable injury to Normand
Knudson.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
FOR THE JURY TO FIND THAT MS. FIX WAS
INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT RESULTING IN
INJURY TO NORMAND KNUDSON.
When challenging the sufficiency of evidence to
support a guilty verdict in a criminal case, a defendant must
first marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict
and then demonstrate how this evidence, even viewed in the
most favorable light, is insufficient to support the verdict.
State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1994); State v.
14

Scheel, 823 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1991).
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE
Ms. Fix's argument is that there was not sufficient
evidence that she should have known that Normand Knudson
suffered an injury.

Counsel can find only three sources of

evidence even arguably supporting this point:
Knudson's testimony.

(1)

Normand

(2) Carol Fix's brief written statement

give to Deputy Thompson

(Trial Exhibit #5); (3)

Normand

Knudson's father's rebuttal testimony.
Mr. Knudson's testimony appears in Tr., Vol. I,
pages 55-126, and, summarized in a light most favorable to a
finding of injury, was that Ms. Fix sped her car at him over
an approximate

130 foot distance

and slammed

into him,

slamming him into the hood and windshield and then off to the
driver's side, slamming him into the adjacent chain link
fence. He claimed to have impacted the car with "...probably
every part of my body: my knees, my torso, my head, my arms,
when I was slammed onto the hood of the car."

Tr., Vol. I,

page 76, lines 5-8. He testified as to his various injuries.
Ms. Fix's statement contains the sentences "I wrote
down her license plate number and was leaving when a man
jumped upon the hood of my car.
was determined to stop me.

He wouldn't get off and he

(He actually ran into the path of

the car and jumped on the hood)."

This presumably means that

Ms. Fix's car knocked Normand Knudson off his feet, and she
should have known that he was, or could be, injured.
15

Normand Knudson's father, Jeffrey Knudson, testified
on rebuttal that Carol Fix's car accelerated at Normand, and
that he actually saw Carol run down his son.

Tr., Vol. II,

pages 179, 180.
Obviously,

Ms. Fix

gave

an

entirely

different

version of what had happened, and counsel acknowledges that
generally, neither a trial court nor an appellate court will
overturn a verdict for insufficient evidence just because a
defendant has a different version of the facts.

State v.

Pilling, supra. An appellate court will reverse on the basis
of

insufficient

evidence

only

when

the

evidence

is so

inconclusive or so improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540 (Utah 1994); State
v. Workman , 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah App. 1991).

It is submitted

that such is the case.
Ms. Fix is arguing that the only evidence of Normand
Knudson7s having suffered an injury, an element of the offense
of leaving the scene, came from his own testimony which was so
inherently improbable when viewed in the light of the physical
evidence which could and should have corroborated something
about his version, that reasonable minds could not have found
an injury. First, however, she will address her statement and
Jeffrey Knudson's rebuttal testimony.
Ms. Fix's Statement, when read in its entirety, does
not support a finding of injury.
16

Her trial testimony, was

that, as she was leaving, Normand Knudson came charging out
from behind the big cement box, looking extremely angry, and
after she braked to a stop, jumped up on the hood of her car,
by which she explained that she meant only that his hands were
on the hood.

See, Statement of Facts, above.

Ms. Fix,s written Statement is actually consistent
with her trial testimony.

Her Statement says that "...He

wouldn't get off and he was determined to stop me."

If she

had run Normand Knudson down and he had been injured and
flopping around helplessly on her hood, why would she make the
statement that he would not get off and was determined to stop
her?

Why would she also say "I did not know the man was hurt

or I would have stopped."

R., page 287, Exhibit #5.

These

statements are not at all supportive of Normand Knudson's
version

of

corroborative

what

led

to

an

injury,

but

of Ms. Fix's trial testimony

rather,

are

that Normand

Knudson was pushing on the hood of her car in an attempt to
keep her from leaving.
As to Jeffrey Knudson's testimony, viewed in its
entirety, it is completely incredible.

Right at the scene,

Jeffrey Knudson told Deputy Thompson that he did not actually
see the car hit his son, because the alleged impact was
blocked from his view by the seven foot cement block.

Tr.,

Vol. II, page 182. He also told Deputy Thompson that his son
was carried approximately 150 feet before he was able to
escape the vehicle. Tr., Vol. II, page 186. Jeffrey Knudson
17

went from claiming he did not see the impact to claiming he
did see it.
explanation

His testimony was not at all credible.
that

he

actually

saw

the

impact

but

His
was

traumatized at the time is undercut completely by his having
told Deputy Thompson that "the impact point was blocked from
[his] view."

Tr., Vol. II, page 182, lines 11-12.

It is one

thing to say simply that you did not see something, and
another to say you did not see it because your view was
blocked.
Thus, the only testimony left to support the finding
of

injury

is Normand

Knudson's.

It

is submitted

that

testimony must be viewed in light of the total lack of
physically corroborating evidence.
First, there was, simply put, no damage to any part
of Ms. Fix's car, as established by the testimony of Deputy
Thompson, the photographic evidence, Exhibit #6, R. at 287,
and Carol Fix's testimony.

Neither was there any damage to

the chain link fence, as established by the testimony of
Normand

Knudson,

Tr., Vol. I, page

78, lines

5-6; the

photographic evidence, R. at 287, and David Lord's testimony.
Mr. Lord established that if Carol Fix's car had been going
even ten or fifteen miles per hour, there would have been
either significant observable injury to Mr. Knudson, and/or
damage to her car.
Dr. Lund established that, approximately four hours
after the incident, Normand Knudson:
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(1)

had no visible

scars, abrasions or pain; (2)
distress; (3)

walked without any apparent

generally showed no apparent injury on exam.

Thus, several hours later, at the hospital emergency room,
Normand Knudson was not observed to demonstrate any physical
corroboration,

either

objectively

(e.g.,

cuts,

bruises,

limping) or subjectively (pain).
The physical evidence at the scene and upon physical
examination are not only inconsistent with any finding of
injury,

but

are

consistent

with

Ms.

Fix/s

version.

Summarized, Ms. Fix testified that there was no impact with
Normand Knudson other than his putting his hands on the hood
briefly; that he never got on the hood, or windshield; that
she inched forward and he hopped around to the driver's side
and eventually punched the window; and that she did not see
him fall because she did not look back and he had pushed her
side view mirror in.
Ms. Fix also testified that she was frightened and
left because of Mr. Knudson's extreme anger and behavior, Tr.,
Vol. II, pages 25-26, 30; Statement, Trial Exhibit #5, R. at
287, and that she told Deputy Thompson, about an hour after
the incident, as follows:
Q - Did Deputy Thompson appear to
you to be more concerned with what had
happened between you and Mr. Knudson or
with what happened with Ms. Bryan?
A - I just think he was doing his
job and trying to find out what happened
overall. He had mentioned that this man
claimed that he was injured, and I told
Deputy Thompson that there was no way he
got injured.
That if he had done any
19

damage whatsoever, he may have broken his
hand from where he punched the window.
Tr., Vol. II, page 33, lines 14-24.
This testimony went basically to the issue of
whether Normand Knudson was angry before he got in front of
the car, which was a theory of the case of Ms. Fix.

Her

theory was supported by the testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr.
David McCann, concerning Normand Knudson's recent medical
history of having been on a prescription

for prozac to

control, among other things, his anger and frustration. Tr.,
Vol. II, page 114, and by Normand Knudson's admitting that he
was not taking prozac on or around the day of the incident,
Tr., Vol. II, pages 167-169.
that

Normand

Knudson

Thus, Ms. Fix's position was

overreacted

totally

to

their

confrontation, and distorted what had occurred.
This was corroborated by Normand Knudson's testimony
at trial. On direct examination, seven months later, he still
referred to Ms. Fix as "...a threat to society." Tr., Vol. I,
page 69, lines 23-24. On cross-examination he denied telling
Deputy Thompson that he would find out where Carol Fix lived
and take care of the problem himself, Tr., Vol. I, pages 9293, but Deputy Thompson testified that he did make that
statement.

Tr., Vol. I, page 150.

In addition, Deputy

Thompson's supervisor, Sergeant Arthur Haney, observed the
same belligerence and threats four hours later at the hospital
emergency room. Tr., Vol. II, pages 108-109. This is further
support for the lack of credibility of Normand Knudson's
20

testimony.
Counsel could not find any Utah case law on the
issue of whether there is an objective or subjective standard
for the finding of "injury."

Judge Taylor defined "bodily

injury" for the jury, Instruction #19, R. at 267, but used the
simple term "injury", rather than bodily injury, in setting
out the elements of the leaving the scene charge, Instruction
#17, R. at 265.
be

objective

Either way, it is submitted that there must

evidence

of

injury,

i.e.,

that,

from

the

evidence, the defendant knew, or should have known, that the
victim had been injured.
As mentioned above, a reversal for insufficient
evidence will only be merited when the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or
inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as
to that element.

State v. Pilling, supra; State v. Scheel,

supra; also, State v. Workman, 852 P. 2d 981 (Utah 1993)
(applying standard to motion to arrest judgment); State v.
Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983); State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d
942 (Utah 1979); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976).
Such

is the case here.

None of the physical evidence

corroborates or supports Normand Knudson's version of the
accident or his alleged injuries.
supports Ms. Fix's version.

The evidence, in fact,

The only evidence supporting a

finding of injury to Mr. Knudson is his own testimony, which,
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it is submitted, is inherently improbable and not credible.
The standard must be that there be evidence of some injury
observable by the defendant, or capable of observation.

In

this case, that evidence was too improbable and incredible.
Ultimately, Normand Knudson's version of events, which is the
only possible factual basis for a conviction, was that he was
struck hard by an accelerating motor vehicle and injured. In
light

of

the

complete

absence

of

observable

physical

corroboration, the jury must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that he was injured.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
REFUSED TO ALLOW EVIDENCE OF NORMAND
KNUDSON'S INTENTION TO SUE MS. FIX FOR
MONEY DAMAGES, OR TO ALLOW A PROFFER AS
TO THE RELEVANCE OF THE SAME.
During cross-examination of Normand Knudson, counsel
for Ms. Fix attempted to show his bias by questioning him
about his intention to sue Ms. Fix civilly for money damages.
Tr., Vol. I, page 98.

Judge Taylor sustained the State,s

objection to the evidence's relevancy, and the following
colloquy occurred:
MR. CUSTEN [Counsel for Ms. Fix]:
May I approach?
THE COURT: No. Sustained.
MR. CUSTEN: May I be heard outside
of the presence of the jury?
THE COURT: No. Sustained.
MR. CUSTEN: May I make a record?
THE COURT: We'll allow you to make
a record afterwards.
MR. CUSTEN: Okay.
THE COURT:
Although you've made
your record.
MR. CUSTEN: Not on that.
THE COURT: Yeah.
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MR. CUSTEN: Not THE COURT:
Now, wait just a
second. Mr. Custen, y ° u ' v e raised your
objection.
That's - that has been
preserved for the record, whatever
objection you have. The fact that I have
chosen not to accept argument on it is
beside the point.
You've made your
record.
MR. CUSTEN: No. I wasn't seeking
to argue, but simply to state the reasons
- outside of the presence of the jury that I felt it was relevant.
THE COURT: I understand, and I'm
saying no. Go ahead.
Tr., Vol. I, page 98, line 23-page 99,
line 23 (emphasis added).
Rule 608(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that
"Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to
impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by
evidence otherwise."

In this case, it was Ms. Fix's position

that Mr. Knudson's testimony, in addition to being inherently
improbable and not credible, was the product of bias because
he had in mind a lawsuit for money damages.

This shows

clearly a reason to misrepresent on Mr. Knudson's part, is
therefore

relevant,

and

the

evidence

should

have

been

admitted.
Judge Taylor then proceeded to compound the error by
refusing to allow defense counsel to proffer his evidence
and/or his reasons for this line of questioning.

Defense

counsel would have proffered that he was going to call a Mr.
Chris

Clougherty,

an

insurance

adjuster

for

Ms.

Fix's

automobile liability carrier, who would have testified, as
follows:

that he interviewed Normand Knudson as part of his
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investigation of the accident within a few weeks of its
occurrence; that Mr. Knudson's first statement to him, even
before the tape recorder was activated, was to ask him how
much liability insurance Ms. Fix had.
Counsel acknowledges that the Record is silent as to
any proffered testimony of Mr. Clougherty. The reason is that
Judge Taylor

foreclosed

counsel's opportunity

to make a

proffer, by mistakenly characterizing it as "your objection",
Tr., Vol. I, page 99, line 13 (emphasis added).

Ms. Fix's

counsel was not objecting; rather, the State objected and the
trial court, after sustaining the objection, refused to hear
argument concerning relevance or any other matter, including
a proffer. Although the Record is silent as to any proffer of
Mr. Clougherty7s testimony, that is because counsel, having
been foreclosed from even arguing or making a record of the
evidence's

bias-based

admissibility

while

cross-examining

Normand Knudson, did not want to engage in what he perceived
to

be

a

futile

attempt

to

introduce

Mr.

Clougherty's

testimony.
Even if it was error to fail to admit the bias
evidence and line of questioning, Ms. Fix must demonstrate
that the error would have had a substantial influence in
bringing about a different verdict.

State v. Hackford, 737

P.2d 200 (Utah 1987); State v. Rammel. 721 P.2d 498 (Utah
1986) .

In this case, as argued above in Point I of this

Brief, the evidence supporting a finding that Normand Knudson
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suffered an "injury" was based solely on his testimony, which
is inherently improbable and not credible.

When viewed in

light of his alleged bias and motive to misrepresent (because
he was after money and it is really his word versus Ms. Fix's
as to what happened) , the failure to allow the line of
questioning could have had a substantial influence in bringing
about a different verdict.
CONCLUSION
One of the elements of leaving the scene of an
accident is that a person suffer an injury.

The injury must

be such that Ms. Fix knew, or should have known, it occurred.
If Ms. Fix had run down Normand Knudson as he alleges, at a
significant rate of speed, she would be guilty and there would
be sufficient evidence to support the verdict.

However, the

evidence of Mr. Knudson's injuries is supported solely by his
testimony.

There is no physically corroborating evidence,

and, in fact, all of the physical evidence supports and
corroborates Ms. Fix's version, which was that only Mr.
Knudson's hands touched her car and, hence, there was no
injury nor did she think there had been injury.
Mr. Knudson's testimony was so inherently improbable
as to be not credible.

As such, there was insufficient

evidence to support the finding of injury.

In addition, the

trial court's failure to allow questioning and testimony
concerning Mr. Knudson's bias and motive to misrepresent, on
the basis of its irrelevance, was error.
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For the above and foregoing reasons, Ms. Fix asks
that this Court reverse her conviction for leaving the scene,
upon the basis of insufficient evidence, and remand to the
trial court with direction to discharge her.
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ADDENDUM

No addendum is needed, because the one relevant
statute is set forth in the Brief.

